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Maryland
Embraces
Emotional
Distress
by Andrea Gentile

Although plaintiff Harris did not prevail
in his case, Jones v. Harris, 35 Md.App.
556, 371 A.2d 1104 (1977) saw the first
direct judicial recognition of intentional
infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort in Maryland.
Harris brought an action for damages
against Jones and against General Motors
Corporation alleging that Jones, while in
the course of his duty as a G.M.C. supervisor, intentionally mimicked his (Harris')
speech impediment, attempted to humiliate him with snide remarks, and continued to do so for an extended period of
time with resulting emotional distress to
Harris.
The tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress has been recognized for
a number of years in California, Virginia
and other jurisdictions. However, as this
was a case of first impression in Maryland,
the court first traced "The Interest In
Freedom From Emotional Distress" from
the 1934 Restatement of Torts which
refused to recognize it as an independent
tort, to PROSSER'S LAW OF TORTS (4th Edition) where the distinguished dean gave
recognition to the tort and described its
boundaries. General recognition of the
tort was found, said the court, in 64
A.L.R. 2d 100 (dealing with emotional
distress) where it is stated that the earlier
case opinions which disallowed recovery
for emotional distress alone should be
treated as dicta. The trend is toward
allowing recovery when there is severe
emotional distress caused by an intentionally or recklessly committed,
unprivileged act of the defendant, which
was reasonably calculated to cause severe
emotional distress to the plaintiff.
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In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931),
the court allowed damages for emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff and
caused by the defendant's agent's delivery
of a package containing a dead rat in lieu
of the requested loaf of bread. The c()Urt
based its decision on a negligence theory,
concluding that the agent of the defendant
had carelessly and negligently performed
his duty by allowing the rat to be
substituted for the bread. However, the
Jones court said that in the Roch case the
string was " ... quite lightly tied ... " to
the tort of negligence, and they infer that
the Roch and Mahnke v Moore, 197 Md.
61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (damages
allowed where the father of a young child
forced her to watch him murder her
mother and then kill himself) were, in
effect, cases of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court concluded
that the new tort would be viable in Maryland in a proper case. 35 Md.App. at 561,
371 A.2d at 1107.
The case of Womack v. Eldridge, 215
Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 140 (1974) provided the guidelines used by the Jones
court to determine when a cause of action
would lie for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. The elements
outlined by the court are:
1. The wrongdoer's conduct is intentional or reckless. Womack held
that, "this element is satisfied where
the wrongdoer had the specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress
or where he intended his specific
conduct and knew or should have
known that emotional distress
would likely result." 35 Md. App. at
569-570, 1371 A.2d at 1108.
2. The conduct is outrageous to the
extent that it offends the generally
accepted standards of decency and
morality.
3. There is a causal connection between the wrongdoer's actions and
the emotional distress.
4. The emotional distress must be
severe.

Harris provided testimony from a coworker as to Jones' conduct toward Harris, and it was probably based on that
testimony that the court found that the
first two elements were clearly met in the
instant case. However, there was no evidence presented to show a causal connection between Jones' alleged harrassment

and Harris' emotional distress. Testimony
by Harris' wife pointed out that Harris'
problems started at least seven months
prior to the time Jones began his harrassment. Emotional distrurbance could be inferred by Mrs. Harris' testimony that in
November, 1974 he was drinking heavily
and threw a meat platter at her. Finally
Harris' own testimony tended to refute his
allegation of causal connection between
his emotional disturbance and Jones' harrassment. He stated that he began seeking
medical attention for his problems six
years prior to this case.
With no evidence to support the third
and fourth elements of the tort, Harris
could not prevail. But the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
now alive in Maryland. Be kind to neighbors and co-workers.

Solicitation
Broadened
by John Jeffrey Ross

Of no small consequence in local criminal jurisprudence is D.C. Code §22-2701,
popularly known as the "solicitation
statute" :
It shall not be lawful for any person to
invite, entice, persuade, or to address
for the purpose of inviting, enticing,
persuading, any person or persons sixteen years of age or over in the District
of Columbia, for the purpose of prostitution, or any other immoral or lewd
purpose ...
Nearly six percent of the arrests in the
District of Columbia in 1975 were for
commercial sex crimes and over 1100 of
these were prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney. See J.D. Welsh and D. Viets, The
Pretrial Offender in the District of Columbia (District of Columbia Bail Agency/Office of Criminal Justice Plans and
Analysis, Washington, D.C. 1977).
The Metropolitan Police Department of
the District is entitled to exercise considerable police power through this
statute, which provides congressional assent to law enforcement activities

designed to pursue the "legitimate national, state, and community interest in
maintaining a decent society." See United
States v. Moses, 339 A.2d 46, 54
(D.C.App., 1975).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently found the opportunity to
consider this statute again in reviewing
the conviction of Diane Dinkins. Dinkins
v. United States, 374 A.2d 292 (D.C.
App., 1977). In affirming this conviction,
the court, sitting en bane, arrived at a
construction of the statute which
broadens considerably its reach and which
some have found to be outrageous.
Diane Dinkins was standing on a corner
in Washington, nattily attired in a red
sweater, blue miniskirt, and knee length
boots. Obviously impressed by Diane's
sartorial display, a plain clothes police
officer who had been cruising the area in
his private car pulled near the sidewalk
where Ms. Dinkins was standing. The
officer rolled down his window and said
"Hi" to Ms. Dinkins, who thereupon approached the car. A conversation ensued
which consisted of typically loaded questions from the police officer and typically
suggestive responses from Ms. Dinkins.
The officer first asked how much the
lady's services would be, and when Ms.
Dinkins finally became explicit as to her
repertoire, she was arrested. After her
conviction in a bench trial, she appealed
to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. A division of this court decided to
reverse the conviction. After the panel's
opinion wa~ circulated to the other judges
on the court, the usual practice, a rehearing en bane was scheduled, and the full
court affirmed.
The appellant claimed that "no solictitation [was] made for prostitution since
Miss Dinkins conduct was responsive ...
rather than [initiatory]." 374 A.2d at
295.
The court disagreed, and in analyzing
the wording of the statute noted that the
word solicif does not specifically appear
and thus its directive-active connotation
as a gravamen of the offense was not applicable to §22-2701. 374 A.2d at 295.
Instead, the court indicated (after research
in Webster's Third New International Dictionary) that words such as "entice" and
"address" which are present in §22-2701

Don't Count
Your Tuition
Before You're
Billed
by John Jeffrey Ross

can describe conduct which is not necessarily active nor initiative in tenor.
Through this analysis, which rivals the
medieval philosophical speculation of the
number of angels on the head of a pin,
conduct which is responsive and even
passive in reaction to a reasonably clever
police officer can be proscribed by law.
The court stated its conclusion as
follows:
We hold that appellant's attire, her
prolonged presence on the street corner, her approach to a complete
stranger, her extremely suggestive verbal responses to the officer, her prompt
discussion of financial terms, and her
ready arrangement for a room are
legally sufficient, when taken together,
for a fact finder to conclude guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 374 A.2d
at 296.
The dissenting opinions noted that the
Court of Appeals has interpreted the law
as a solicitation statute. Id. at 297. The
gist of the dissent was that "it must be
affirmatively demonstrated that [she] invited, enticed, persuaded, or addressed
. . . for purposes of prostitution." Id. at
298 (emphasis in original). The minority
indicated that the police officer's remarks
themselves could well be taken to constitute violations of §22-2701. Id.
The second dissenting opinion stated:
I had always thought that if a prostitute
is merely standing on a corner she may
not be convicted of [a violation] of this
statute simply because she is a prostitute. Only if she solicits for prostitution
may a conviction follow. I would have
thought a construction of the statute
was that simple, but now it seems that
it is not. 374 A.2d at 299.

In Basch v. George Washington University, 370 A.2d 1364 (D.C.App., 1977),
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
considered a claim by plaintiff medical
students that the defendant university
breached its contract with them by charging tuition increases far exceeding those
listed in the medical school bulletin.
The George Washington University
Bulletin: School of Medicine and Health
Sciences, published for the 1974-1975
year, listed estimated tuition increases of
approximately $200.00 per year over the
base tuition of $3200.00 for 1974-1975.
Many students, according to appellants/plaintiffs, contended that their
decision to attend George Washington
was influenced by these estimated costs.
When the university issued a "Statement
of Tuition Rates" in January, 1975,
revealing tuition costs far in excess of
those outlined as estimates by the
bulletin, the students complained in a suit
in D.C. Superior Court. Treating a defendant's motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, the trial court found that
as a matter of law the students were not
entitled to relief. The case was taken to
the Court of Appeals .
The issue before the court was whether
the university was to be contractually
bound to projected tuition increases. The
appellants renewed their claim that it was.
Considering the fact that medical school
tuition costs in the District have reached,
or will reach $12,000 per year at George
Washington and Georgetown universities,
this claim on the part of the students was
certainly an urgent one.
The court began its discussion by noting the general rule that terms set down in
a university bulletin can become part of
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